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Princeps educatus w myśli Jana z Salisbury
I hate stupid people, stupid works and philosophical aphorisms.
John of Salisbury, Policraticus
The terms “rationality” and “rationalism” have many meanings in the 
linguistic tradition.1 They are not synonymous. They derive from the word 
“ration” (ratio).2 However, it is the word “rationalisation” (rationalis) understood 
as: “activities intended to achieve the intended purpose in a more perfect manner 
than previously used; improvement in a given field”3 that seems more useful for 
the purposes of this text. I assume that in the process of authority the ultimate 
verifier is the factor of effectiveness, and if so, its appraisal often (though not 
exclusively) refers to rational arguments (actually rational or recognised as such). 
They will manifest both in the critical, apologetic or conformist approach. It is 
reasonable to distinguish the rationality of the aims and the rationality of the 
1  Cf. J. Tokarski (red.), Słownik Wyrazów Obcych PWN, Warszawa 1980, p. 620, 621. Also: 
G.L. Seidler, Notatki o racjonalizmie, Lublin 1998, p. 8, 9.
2  Although the term “rationalism” refers to modern times, Grzegorz L. Seidler rightly says, 
“Rationalism, this significant and important word in the culture of the West, may be defined, as many 
other words, in different ways. In our discussion, it refers to a wide range of ideas which express 
the belief that the universe functions in the same way as the man’s mind when he thinks in a logical 
and objective way. Thus, the man can eventually understand everything he comes across (…). 
A rationalist is sure that what he understands is natural and that there is nothing that is supernatural”, 
ibidem, p. 9. In this sense, rationalism is to be linked with the 18th century and the Enlightenment, in 
particular. 
3  Słownik Wyrazów Obcych…, p. 620. Similarly: Słownik języka polskiego, t. III, H. Szkiłądź, 
S. Bik, B. Pakosz, C. Szkiłądź (red.), Warszawa 1989, p. 7.
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measures for achieving them. This applies both to the rationality of the man and 
social groups or the society as a whole, including the rationalisation of the State. 
The commonly known definition of politics formulated by Aristotle strongly 
emphasises rationalism and rationalisation of the public activities. Politics belongs 
in the category of practical science. The man’s highest good, that is happiness, is 
achieved through activities that are in accordance with the reason and a virtuous 
life. Thus, the man’s most important task is to train his mind and to explore the 
world in more depth. It is significant that he distinguished, among others, the 
intellectual virtues, i.e. knowledge and wisdom. Anyway, they are never fully 
attainable. In the relation between the ruled and the ruling, the latter were attributed 
only the virtue of understanding by him.4
The issue of rationalisation of power is in some ways a reflection of the 
question of accepting or rejecting the rationality of man as a subject of the relation 
of power. Therefore, it assumes a minimum level of the discernment of the relation 
of power, and the perception of its subjectivity, or the lack of it, or restrictions. 
The rationality of man appears to be primary to the rationality of power, or at 
least is its practical and necessary prerequisite. This does not mean that there is 
no reciprocal impact of authority back on the rationality of the behaviour of the 
other party, that is the subordinates. We are dealing here with the mutual effects 
of both subjects of power, though the motive of behaviour is different. On the part 
of the ruling, these are all measures to retain and broaden the authority, and on 
the part of the ruled, to ensure the predictability of authority to, at least, keep the 
desired goods.5 It should be emphasised that traditionally, in political and legal 
thought, the vast majority of postulates to the authority which expose the idea of 
its rationality are formulated by the ruled. They want to arrange the relations with 
the ruler in a fair manner (according to their understanding of the concept), based 
on even simple rules of reason, while others refer to much more complex rational 
arguments by supporting their postulates with recognised rules of thinking and 
the principle of basing them on truth. The extent and strength of such arguments 
are historically variable and are linked not only with the development of the 
civilisation in the sense of the ever newer techniques and measures of ruling, 
but also, and perhaps above all, with the sphere of the worldview. Their degree 
of rational sophistication is firmly grounded in the realities of the era and its 
underlying ideas. Particularly strong distortions of the proportion of the rationality 
of the rulers and the ruled, occur in all historical totalitarian systems.6 Rationalism 
4  Cf. Aristotle, Politics, Book III 2, 4–10.
5  Cf. K.A. Wittfogel, Władza totalna, Toruń 2002, p. 155 ff.
6  Karl A. Wittfogel says: “It is obvious that ruling duties may be performed in a manner that 
satisfies the interests of the rulers at the expense of the non-governmental social powers. They may 
also be performed in a manner that satisfies the needs of the people, and brings few, if any, benefits to 
the government. The intermediate solutions boil down to a compromise between these two extremes. 
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is traditionally opposed to actions based on emotional reasons. The latter cannot 
be underestimated. Sometimes, or even very often, they surpass the national 
arguments which demand a completely different behaviour (action or omission).7
The problem of the rationality of power is multidimensional. These dimensions 
include, in general sense: 1. The issues of the origins and essence of the State and 
other forms of authority (the philosophical aspect), 2. The question of the legitimacy 
of power (the political and legal aspect and the psychological aspect), 3. Specifying 
the aims and methods of their implementation as formulated and proposed by the 
rulers (the praxeological and political aspect), 4. The assessment and the demand for 
the efficiency of the State’s functioning and the effectiveness of its action seen both 
from the perspective of the ruled, but also from the perspective of the rulers (the socio-
economic and political aspect). In the detailed understanding, the rationality of the 
authority in relation to the State can be reduced to the issue of the reason of the State.
I believe that there is no contradiction in searching for the criterion of rationality, 
both in the metaphysical (in the sense of the metaphysics in St. Thomas’ approach) 
concepts of authority and in a purely empirical and pragmatic approach. One just 
needs to remember about the appropriate methodological consequence of these 
approaches. Especially about the fact that in this case, the faith is, assumably, ahead 
of the reason (science). There is no reason for the assumptions of faith, in the sense 
of its dogmas, and the essence of religion not to be rationalised. Their rational 
implementation, if only in terms of the attempt to determine the essence of Deity, 
the function of faith in its various aspects, including the functional one in the sense 
of the measures used to carry out the worship is most possible. Or even obvious.8 
However, “In its beginnings, rationalism attempted to remove from the human vision 
of the world the thought of God and the supernatural phenomena, assuming that the 
latter will be able to be gradually cognisable thanks to scientific research methods”.9
As a means of exercising the power, these three alternatives are seriously considered only if actual 
conditions allow an actual choice. (…) However, in all these areas of national responsibility, the 
interest of the people is sacrificed for the optimal rationality of the rulers”, ibidem, pp. 155–156.
7  Here, one may and should refer already to the thought of Aristotle. He writes: “The weak 
deliberate, but then are prevented by passion from keeping to their resolution; the impetuous are 
led by passion because they do not stop to deliberate: since some people withstand the attacks of 
passion, whether pleasant or painful, by feeling or seeing them coming, and rousing themselves, that 
is, their reasoning faculty, in advance, just as one is proof against tickling if one has just been tickled 
already”, Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 1150 b, 20. Also cf. E. Nowak, O uczuciach i emocjach 
na poważnie (nie tylko dla nauczycieli etyki), „Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna” 
2012, t. I, p. 27 ff.
8  The manifestation of this approach is the attempt to define the concept of religion. 
Arguments involved in defining this concept manifest the rationalision of faith. Cf. P. Szymaniec, 
Koncepcje wolności religijnej. Rozwój historyczny i współczesny stan debaty w zachodniej myśli 
polityczno-prawnej, Wrocław 2017, pp. 11–45.
9  G.L. Seidler, op.cit., p. 9.
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Rationality is only one method of exercising the relation of the authority 
which is determined by the doctrine that specifies the essence and functions of 
the State. Sometimes the authority can even act irrationally. To a greater or lesser 
extent, rationalising arguments occur in each doctrine. However, all doctrines also 
refer, in varying degrees, to non-rational arguments. 
The evolution of political systems is characterised by the increasing 
subjectivisation of the ruled, which, in turn, leads to the blurring of differences in 
the expectations of both parties. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt aptly writes: “In historical 
bureaucratic systems rulers had a monopoly when it comes to making authoritative 
political decisions. The political aspirations of the subordinates manifested only in 
potential, but not fully institutionalised requests posed towards the rulers-requests 
that only the rulers could turn into political aims”.10
This issue is constantly present in thinkers and politicians’ discussion on 
authority, governance and the State. Jan Malarczyk emphasises: “The qualities of 
the ruler governing the State and the principles of politics which he should follow, 
have for centuries aroused the interest of thinkers and politicians. This problem 
particularly attracted the attention of the philosophers of the ancient Greece (…)”.11
Before the numerous texts in the Renaissance era relating to the problem 
of good authority or rational authority, which typically would be treated as 
synonymous, a kind of preparation for this explosion of texts devoted to the issue, 
is seen in the Middle Ages.12
The Middle Ages was the era of the duality of power. The concept and 
understanding of authority was dynamic at that time. In the early Middle 
10  Shmuel N. Eisenstadt furher states that “In the modern systems, the formal political 
difference between rulers and ruled becomes continually obliterated; both develop as relatively direct 
holders or representatives of political power, orientation, and demands. The process of political 
decision-making becomes largely vested in a somewhat new type of ruling elite – an elite whose 
foremost claim to legitimation is that its members represent different groups of the society, their 
values and orientations. This new kind of elite attempts to incorporate these values and aspirations 
in the political process and to translate them into the ultimate goals of the polity”, S.N. Eisenstadt, 
The Political Systems of Empires, New York 1969, p. 370.
11  J. Malarczyk, Wizerunek renesansowego władcy, „Annales UMCS. Sectio G” 1974, 
vol. XXI, nr 4, p. 67. Among others: Socrates, Plato Aristotle, Isocrates, Xenophon, “or particularly 
Plutarch, whose Parallel Lives has been widely read”, ibidem, p. 68. This issue would also interest 
the Roman Stoics, particularly Polybius, Cicero, Seneca or Marcus Aurelius. 
12  Jan Malarczyk notices: “The victory of the Catholic Church and its teachings in the 
medieval Europe added a new problem to the issues of authority and the State, that is the relation of 
secular authority to the ecclesiastical authority and religious principles. The commonly prevailing 
monarchic form of governing would still, despite a partial change, validate the problem of the 
qualities and competences of the monarch and the character, aim and the assumptions of its politics. 
Among the numerous treatises devoted to the issue, two of them have been eternally renown – 
Thomas Aquinas’ unfinished treatise De regimine principium and Dante Alighieri’s De Monarchia”, 
ibidem, p. 68.
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Ages, the issue was approached differently than in the medieval period of “the 
Enlightenment”.13 In this situation, the rational or rationalising arguments were 
referred to by both the proponents of the papalistic vision of the State, as well as 
the supporters of the concept of the autonomous secular authority. It needs to be 
remembered that at the time of John of Salisbury (c. 1115–1180), the State was 
confessional, the difference between the sacred and the profane is just intuitively 
perceived and is part of a long and complex process, which in some ways will be 
completed with Niccolo Machiavelli’s definition of the State.
John of Salisbury’s ideas concerning good authority precede the ones of St. 
Thomas Aquinas’ and Dante’s by about one hundred years.14 It is a long period, 
only at the end of which there appears the previously unknown to the then Latin 
culture, Politics by Aristotle. This is not the only argument which stimulates to 
investigate the problem. The significance of John of Salisbury’s views stems from 
the fact that he discussed the issue of the authority of the prince in abstracto, 
by describing the qualities of every ruler and not by assigning his observations 
and conclusions solely to one particular ruler (as much later Callimachus did in 
relation to Jan Olbracht). The treatise on the prince is a treatise on the original 
understanding of the essence of public authority and a proposal of a kind of 
a socio-technique derived from the contemporary understanding of Christianity.
13  Jan Baszkiewicz writes: “The early medieval king considered himself to be the secular deputy 
of God on earth; in his kingdom he was »second after God« and participated in God’s reign of the world. 
Thus, some part of God’s power streamed down on his untouchable and sacred person. Out of God’s 
mercy, the monarch enjoys superhuman power, sometimes even miracle power. Such royal religion would 
increase the authority of the ruler, protect from plots and increase the loyalty of great lords. Yet, since the 
time of the reform of the Church, rulers began to lose even this; popes and theologians fervently began to 
»de-sacralise kings«”, J. Baszkiewicz, Władza, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1999, p. 27.
14  In this paper, I omit Dante’s ideas. I limit the discussion to two authors. It needs to be noted 
that “What both medieval thinkers (John of Salisbury and St. Thomas – L.D.) mean by »authority« is 
the social relation where one party (the ruler), by means of his actions that are independent of the will 
of the other party (the ruled), has the power to create given aims, phenomena and duties in the sphere 
of spiritual or physical life, as well as to shape the other party’s relations with the external world. 
According to John of Salisbury and Thomas Aquinas, the state is a natural creation. The man cannot, 
in principle, function on his own, as he is naturally destined to befriend other individuals of the same 
species: homo homini amicus et familiars”, L. Dubel, M. Łuszczyńska, Jan z Salisbury i św. Tomasz 
z Akwinu o władzy godnej i niegodnej, [in:] Z. Władek et al. (red.), Księga życia i twórczości. Prawo, 
t. V, Księga pamiątkowa dedykowana Profesorowi Romanowi A. Tokarczykowi, Lublin 2013, p. 45. 
St. Thomas defines monarchy as the best political system. Earlier, the same idea appears in John 
of Salisbury. Andrzej Sylwestrzak writes that in Thomas Aquinas’ monarchy “the State’s aims are 
reduced to national actions that order the life of the individual and the community in a fair manner. 
It is the »light of the reason« that makes the citizen and the society act towards the fulfilment of 
own good, thus good understood in the categories of the broadest communisation”, A. Sylwestrzak, 
Akwinaty cypryjski „monarcha chrześcijański”, [in:] A. Madeja (red.), Nam hoc natura aequum 
est…: Księga Jubileuszowa ku czci Profesora Janusza Justyńskiego w siedemdziesięciolecie urodzin, 
Toruń 2012, p. 98. 
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The postulates for the rationalisation of authority are determined by John 
of Salisbury’s worldview. His views are expressed by the boundless recognition 
of Christianity as the only absolute and universal value and a system that 
completely explains the essence of the world subordinated to God. Hence, also 
humanity. The issue of authority is consistently discussed in this context. His 
concept of rationality and the rationalisation of authority derives mainly from this 
prerequisite and is justified with arguments derived from both a solid education, 
extraordinary reason and absolute fidelity to the Church.
The issue of rational authority is preceded by a more general issue, the 
prerequisite of the reasonable human nature. He emphasises: 
Recognition connotes certitude and applies either to learning or to faith. Let the rule of faith 
be deferred however, as it will be discussed in its own time and place. Learning then involves 
knowledge of self, which cannot be attained if it fails to measure its own strength or if it be ignorant 
of the strength of others. Consciousness consists of having self-confidence either in knowledge, or 
in the faith. [...] A man with a certain knowledge has knowledge about himself, which may not take 
place if man does not appreciate his own strength or is ignorant when it comes to others.15 
This knowledge is revealed, either by reason or by the revelation of grace. 
This truth applies to everyone, as every man carries in his heart “a book open for 
those dedicated to the reason”. Hence, the man should live a life based on truth 
and virtue, it is the obligation of every single rational person. While “its contrary 
is ignorance and her hateful and hostile offspring, vice”.16
John of Salisbury assumes, however, that it is not the autonomous reason 
itself, but the natural law inscribed, “imprinted” in the heart of every man, and 
hence also in the heart of the ruler (and in all other members of the body), and 
reminding of this law by constant studies on it that is the source of his sound use.17
Based on these assumptions he forms the following opinions on the essence 
of authority: Firstly, it is a vision of a sinless monarch. In his opinion, it is basically 
15  John of Salisbury, Policraticus albo o paplaninie dworaków i przekazach filozofów, Lublin 
2008, p. 49. He explains that: “This life fills every created thing because without it there is no substance 
for its creation. For all that is exists by reason of sharing in it. But, though it be by nature in all 
things, by grace it dwells only in the rational. They exist therefore because truth is in them; they are 
enlightened because wisdom is in them; they love the good because the source of goodness and charity 
is in them (…). Knowledge precedes the cultivation of virtue, for no one can truly seek that of which 
he is ignorant; nor can evil be effectively shunned unless it be known”, ibidem, p. 48, 49.
16  Ibidem, p. 49.
17  It is emphasised by Bogdan Szlachta: “Rulers using reason, used God’s gift for the sake of 
everybody’s good, thus fulfilling the Creator-made models imprinted in the secondary nature, which 
also were the criteria of the correctness of their actions, recognised by means of the inherent reason 
in the nature of communities which they ruled, yet which they did not create but only looked after its 
»behaviour« and »well-being«”, B. Szlachta, Monarchia prawa. Szkice z historii angielskiej myśli 
politycznej do końca epoki Plantagenetów, Kraków 2001, pp. 105–106. 
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the only condition to recognise the ruler as a real prince (princeps). The opposite 
of such legitimate authority is a tyrant. It is to be served by the requirement of 
appropriate education. He should be a princeps educatus (litteratus). Secondly, 
this is the organic vision of the state in which the political body is ruled by the 
head, that is the habitat of reason, which is subject only to the conscience, that is 
the clergy.18 The structure of the State reflects the wisdom of God, who created man 
“in his own image and likeness”. Hence, the State is the reflection (expression) of 
humanity and its rational part. Thirdly, the various parts of the State (its members) 
imitate the man and cooperate with one another. The two values previously raised 
by Augustine: ordinis and pax are possible to ensure with rationally acting and 
thus fair authority of the prince, already named by John of Salisbury as public 
authority.19 Fourthly, the authority of the prince is realised in protecting the law 
of God both by him and by his subjects, and its objective is the realisation of 
the common good. The public authority and the public body serve not only to 
punish those guilty of the violation of law in all its dimensions, but they also have 
positive tasks to do.20
First of all, the postulate for the reign of the prince, and thus not a tyrant, 
is derived from the idea of sinlessness of the ruler. This is the main assumption 
made by John of Salisbury, and the following suggestions (e.g. the rationality of 
authority) are only its derivatives.
The implementation of the above objectives in practice is to be the result of 
certain rational guarantees which John of Salisbury demands from the authority of 
the prince. Hence, it should be noted that a priority for him was God’s law written 
in the intimate self of the prince, in his heart. He is close here to Augustine’s 
concept of the law of nature. However, the factor of reason is already much more 
noticed and appreciated. Only St. Thomas recognises the important place of 
reason by writing: “What man obtains by way of reasoning, is at the same time 
in accordance with reason, while what is known by revelation does not contain 
anything that would be contrary to reason”.21
John of Salisbury only permits such rationalisation of authority that directly 
serves to ensure the integrity of the prince and his fair reign and is derived from 
the law of God. The prince is a public authority because he implements the general 
interest. Thus, in fact, the prince serves out of the will of and for the natural law. 
18  Cf. ibidem, p. 119.
19  Cf. L. Dubel, Wprowadzenie, [in:] Policraticus…, op. cit., p. 16.
20  Szlachta writes that in this approach the authority “was already also recognised as the 
power helping the weak, the ability to direct everybody’s action towards the aim of people living 
in a community, not by coercion, and not at the ruler’s order, but out of a natural inclination to 
subordinate to people leading them towards the proper aim”, B. Szlachta, op. cit., pp. 101–102.
21  M. Łuszczyńska, Ubi ratio, ibiius. Doktryna prawna świętego Tomasza z Akwinu, Lublin 
2013, p. 58.
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Not only formally, but also actually, his behaviour has to be not only an expression 
of the knowledge of this law, but also the result of its acceptance by “inscribing 
in the heart”. This intimate adoption of God’s law by the prince is even more 
important than the letter of the law. And it is to be, first and foremost, the only 
internal imperative guiding the prince on the right path to a fair reign.22 In this 
case, the rational element is less important than emotional factors. The reason 
must be subjected, without any doubt, to the voice of conscience. So it seems that 
it is difficult to find straightforward rationality in the concept of authority in this 
description like later in St. Thomas’ approach, or as we understand it today.
Let us remember, however, that this thesis is the paradigm of John of Salisbury’s 
further discussions. This paradigm is based on the dogmas of Christianity. And those 
do not submit to the judgment of reason but derive directly from the truths of the 
faith and shall not be subject to questioning. They specify the ultimate boundaries 
of the human reason. While the foundation of meeting the paradigm of the authority 
of the prince as a public authority is the whole system of guarantees of rational 
behaviour that is derived by John of Salisbury from the rules of logical thinking and 
life experience, underlined by the authority of eminent philosophers of antiquity.
 He especially postulates for the rationality of statutory law, which he, 
however, strictly refers to the sovereignty of God’s law, writing that “a statute or 
ordinance (constitutio) of the prince is a thing of nought if not in conformity with 
the teaching of the Church. This did not escape the notice of that most Christian 
prince, who required of his laws that they should not disdain to imitate the sacred 
canons”.23 The prince is to be, as mentioned before, the servant of God’s law. He 
writes:  
It is added: He shall keep it with him, and read therein all the days of his life”. Observe how 
great should be the diligence of the prince in keeping the law of God. He is enjoined always to have 
it, read it, and turn it over in his mind, even as the King of kings, born of woman, born under the law, 
fulfilled the whole justice of the law, though He was subject to it not of necessity but of His own free 
will; because His will was embodied in the law, and on the law of God He meditated day and night.24 
22  “And it shall be when he sitteth upon the throne of his kingdom that he shall write him 
a copy of this law of the Deuteronomy in a book. Let us notice that the prince cannot ignore the law 
and, although he enjoys many privileges, he cannot disregard God’s laws under the pretext of the 
military spirit. This is the Repeated Law (Deuteronomic Law), that is the second law, and thus it is to 
be written in the book of his heart, so that the first law that is written on paper is in accordance with 
the second law that is recognised by the mystic mind. The first law could be written on stone tables; 
but the second law was inscribed nowhere but in the pure mind of the spirit. And the prince acts 
rightly in writing the Deuteronomic Law in the book of his mind as he can thus reflect on this Law 
in his mind without letters that can disappear from before his eyes. And hence, the letter of law is 
observed in such a way that there is no discrepancy with the integrity of his soul”, John of Salisbury, 
Policraticus…, pp. 74–75.
23  Ibidem, p. 75.
24  Ibidem, p. 75.
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Though it seems that for John of Salisbury the most important thing is the 
adoption of the standards of God’s law and anchoring them in his heart, practically 
the ruler should constantly study this law. Such constant studies ensure that he can 
never forget about it.25 A condition for the implementation of such an assumption 
for princes (because of the obligation of daily studies of the text of God’s law) is 
to be literate.26
Rationality is inscribed in the heart of the monarch by God, and, therefore, 
it is something more than just having formal education. Naturally, the study of 
God’s law requires an ongoing intellectual effort. At the same time, he notes that in 
practice there are some illiterate rulers. In this situation, only due to the exceptional 
integrity and virtue of the illiterate prince, he may be granted a dispensation from 
the requirement of education, yet he has to be surrounded by literate (educated) 
people. Thanks to his council, he will be able to carry out his duties properly. 
The guarantee of his proper actions is especially the consultation of the advice of 
priests who are experts in writing. It is through them: “Thus let the mind of the 
prince read through the medium of the priest’s tongue, and whatever of excellence 
he sees in their lives, let him revere it as the law of the Lord. For the life and 
tongue of priests are like a book of life before the face of peoples”.27 There is 
25  Cf. L. Dubel, M. Łuszczyńska; Jan z Salisbury i św. Tomasz z Akwinu o władzy godnej 
i niegodnej…, p. 49.
26  “And perchance you will not often find that priests are bidden to read the law daily. But 
the prince is to read it daily, and all the days of his life; because the day on which he does not read 
the law is for him a day not of life but of death. But plainly he will hardly be able to do this if he 
is illiterate. Wherefore in the letter which I remember that the king of the Romans sent to the king 
of the Franks, urging him to have his children educated in liberal studies, he added tastefully to his 
other arguments that an illiterate king is like an ass who wears a crown”, ibidem, p. 77.
27  In the Attic Nights I remember to have read when the notable traits and habits of Philip of 
Macedon were treated, that among other things his love of letters coloured as it were the business 
of war and the triumphs of victory, the liberality of his table, the offices of humanity and whatever 
he did or said gracefully or elegantly. He recognised that in this quality he excelled others, and was 
anxious to transmit it as the basis of his inheritance to the only son who he hoped would be the 
heir of his kingdom and good fortune. For this reason he thought fit to write his famous letter to 
Aristotle, who he hoped would become the teacher of the newly born Alexander. It is substantially 
in the following words: “Philip sends greetings to Aristotle. Know that a son has been born to me, 
for which I give thanks to the Gods not more because he has been born than because his birth has 
chanced in your life-time. For I hope that it will come to pass that, educated and trained by you, 
he will grow up worthy of ourselves and of taking over such great affairs”. I do not remember that 
the Roman emperors or commanders, so long as their commonwealth flourished, were illiterate. 
And I do not know how it chances, but since the merit of letters has languished among princes, the 
strength of their military arm has become enfeebled and the princely power itself has been as it were 
cut off at the root. But no wonder, since without wisdom no government can be strong enough to 
endure or even to exist. Socrates, who was pronounced by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest of 
men, and who without contradiction excelled incomparably, not only in reputation for wisdom but 
also in virtue, those who are called the seven sages, asserted that commonwealths would only be 
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a clearly formulated political postulate for subordinating the authority of priceps 
to the wisdom of priests, particularly if his own wisdom is not sufficient. When his 
formal knowledge of God’s law is incomplete due to the lack of education. What 
is more important in this case, however, is the sense of the law of God written in 
the heart of the ruler, though, yet it is insufficient.
The wisdom of the ruler is a prerequisite for the success of the kingdom, 
and especially the durability of his reign, and the ruler is not able to ensure the 
stability and the durability of the state if he himself is not a priest of it. This 
value is important not only for the Christian ruler. It is a kind of a universal 
truth. In his opinion, the ancient people, though they were not the followers of 
the religion of Moses, considered education and knowledge as great values.28 
Undoubtedly, wisdom was the guidance in life for the ancient people. John of 
Salisbury particularly reminds of the fundamental importance of virtue (that is 
wisdom) in Socrates’ approach. But he also cites other arguments, particularly by 
referring to the Book of Proverbs. Thus, the postulate for the rational authority is 
underlined by specific conditions. One of them is knowledge in the natural and 
formal dimensions. The latter is to be possessed, if not by the prince himself, 
then by the priests who are his advisors. The postulate for the prince to use their 
knowledge is firmly formed. The prince must listen to the priests, as what they 
communicate is “as if divine”.
Other members of the State are to carry out their tasks while always bearing 
in mind they are only an extension of the prince’s will. The prince is the head of 
the political body, and the head is, indeed, the habitat of the reason.29
The doctrine of John of Salisbury, relating the essence of the accepted 
authority of the prince to justice mainly, while emphasising its public dimension, 
also raises some specific issues, such as, for example, the issue of the activities of 
the prince’s officials. John’s comments, observations and conclusions concern all 
officials, both lay and clerical. However, he separately discusses the position of 
nobles, who “are allowed more”, which does not mean everything. He discusses 
the problem of officials in several contexts: the authority of the prince, the 
happy if they were governed by philosophers or if their rulers at least became students and lovers of 
wisdom, John of Salisbury, op. cit., p. 78.
28  He emphasised that “Wherefore the ancient philosophers thought fit that the likeness 
of wisdom should be depicted before the doors of all temples and that these words should be 
inscribed thereon: I am begotten by Experience, born of Memory; »Sophia« the Greeks call me, you 
»Sapientia«”, ibidem, p. 79.
29  Szlachta indicates: “Hence the growing importance of the organic concept of the political 
community, which manifested in nature, and was the actual being, if caused by the reason of an 
educated prince that is free from particular passions, and thus disinterested; as only the community 
ruled by a rational ruler who recognised the principle of existence and thus participating in the 
divine act of norm-making, was legitimised by God and reflected the natural model”, B. Szlachta, 
op. cit., , pp. 101–102.
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governors of provinces, proconsuls – that is travelling judges, fiscal collectors 
and officials, other judiciary officers, and also generally, as a category,”nobles”. 
However, it should be pointed out that all these considerations are derived from 
John of Salisbury’s analysis which was carried out at a much higher degree of 
abstraction and related to the essence of the authority of princeps. Hence, in the 
discussion of the relation the prince – officials, comments on officials are carried 
out from the perspective of the importance of this group for the prosperity of the 
prince, and this only leads in consequence to the good of the people (respublic). In 
this regard, he recognises the following cause and effect relations: the prince who 
is the servant of the law is also potentially a good clerical apparatus and retention 
of justice. A tyrant is both the actual selection of the worst personalities to the 
clerical state and, as a result, the destruction of justice. 
John extensively discusses specific clerical categories, to which he devotes 
several chapters of his work. These texts constitute an interesting contribution, 
mainly in terms of clerical ethics. The ethics of officials in the normative sense 
is to be an expression of the rationalisation of the authority of the prince. John 
of Salisbury dedicates quite extensive excerpts of his work to this subject. 
He does not, however, deal with the formal problems of the clerical structure, 
but exactly with the quality of the officials; he identifies their attitudes, makes 
critical comments and represents quite clearly a certain outline of the system 
of normative ethics. Subjectively, he most often refers to the generally defined 
category of “officials”, which he called “the unarmed hand”, paying a lot of 
attention particularly to tax collectors and tax officials, judges, military men and 
priests. This issue is mainly discussed in Book IV and Chapter I of Book VI of 
Policraticus. It needs to be noted, however, that these issues very often appear in 
other books and chapters of this work, which proves that he was keenly interested 
in these issues both a theoretician and a chronicler of the customs of his time. 
Of course, he did not consciously make a proposal of the code of clerical ethics, 
although his discussion is extensive, structured and systematic. No less important 
category of officials is “the armed hand”, that is the army.30 Both “hands” can act 
rightly or wrongly. However, although both can be used, it is “the armed” one that 
is employed against the enemies, and the unarmed may be stretched out “against 
the citizen also”.31
The arguments of his normative ethics are comprehensive. First of all, he 
resorts to theological justifications, historical and contemporary examples, the 
remarks by great authorities, and, finally, his own opinions and “common-reason” 
knowledge. He often refers to the Bible. John of Salisbury’s normative ethics is, 
30  Cf. L. Dubel, Deontologia urzędnicza w ujęciu Jana z Salisbury, [in:] J. Justyński, A. Madeja 
(red.), Moralność i władza jako kategorie myśli politycznej, Warszawa 2011, pp. 172–189.
31  Cf. John of Salisbury, op. cit., pp. 140–141.
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to a certain extent, at times “softened” by the writer’s past life experiences or even 
other authorities’ opinions. This can be seen, for example, in the issue of the ban 
to bribe officials.32
In terms of the assessment of the functioning of the principality, he strongly 
emphasises the need to perceive different possibilities of the princeps’s behaviour. 
The basic directive specifying the manner of behaviour is, first and foremost, proper 
human behaviour of a man whose responsibilities directly derive from nature and 
who must act towards it properly. He writes that the justification of this absolute 
“appropriateness”of behaviours is the fact that this law applies to any entity in the 
same way. Therefore, it is a kind of obligation towards the laws of nature. No one 
is exempt from it. Even the prince. Besides, there are also legal obligations which 
apply to individual subjects. They may in practice aim atlegitimate and illegitimate 
purposes. The illegitimate purposes are those that derive from the rejection of 
everything that is not “dictated by the innate reason or obligation”. Then, we have 
to deal with the violation of conflict of the laws of nature. However, these other 
obligations are clear and important for all and receive the dimension of fairness just 
when they arise from the reason and the honest intention.
The primary role of the prince is making and applying law. By making 
judgements he protects the common good, and hence deserves to be called a public 
authority.33 Although, in fact, he is the law for himself, this does not imply the 
permission to commit acts of iniquity. The law which he makes applies to everyone. 
What is vastly desirable is the practice of activities of the prince who is obliged to act 
in accordance with the law in force.34 Everyone is obliged to accept the restrictions 
resulting from this hierarchical system of laws. Thus, making sure that the laws are 
obeyed in the state, the prince should obey them himself. Formally, he stands above 
its own law. In practice, though, he should not break it. Thus, he writes: 
However, it is said that the prince is absolved from the obligations of the law; but this is not 
true in the sense that it is lawful for him to do unjust acts, but only in the sense that his character 
should be such as to cause him to practice equity not through fear of the penalties of the law but 
through love of justice; and should also be such as to cause him from the same motive to promote 
the advantage of the commonwealth, and in all things to prefer the good of others before his own 
private will.35
32  Cf. ibidem, pp. 180–182.
33  John of Salisbury explains: “Public welfare which fosters the state and its individual citizens 
consists in sanctity of life, for life is man’s most cherished possession and its sanctity his greatest 
blessing”, John of Salisbury, op. cit., p. 47.
34  He writes: “Need I ask whether one whom this law binds is restrained by no law? Surely 
this law is divine and cannot be broken with impunity. Every word thereof is a thunderclap in the 
ears of princes if they would be wise”, ibidem, p. 69.
35  Ibidem, p. 63.
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The description of the position and the role of the prince intuitively expresses the 
later idea of the theory of the two Petrine swords. In his opinion, the Church wields 
the sword of power and the prince wields as if part of the sword that he obtained 
from the Church. He uses it to punish the guilty, as the Church may not defile by 
oppressing others. Although: “For every office existing under, and concerned with 
the execution of, the sacred laws is really a religious office, but that is inferior which 
consists in punishing crimes, and which therefore seems to be typified in the person 
of the hangman”.36 The power of the prince is, in fact, lower than the power of the 
Church. Under specific conditions, the prince may pass his rights onto an official, 
however, he still remains the executor of the law in spe.
In the application of the law, though he is mainly the executor of it, the prince 
must be impartial and judge a case objectively in accordance with the letter, and 
the spirit, of the law. 
Truly the sword of princely power is as the sword of a dove, which contends without gall, 
smites without wrath, and when it fights, yet conceives no bitterness at all. For as the law pursues 
guilt without any hatred of persons, so the prince most justly punishes offenders from no motive of 
wrath but at the behest, and in accordance with the decision, of the passionless law.37 
That is a clearly formulated idea of impartial judgement relating directly to 
the prince, but through him also to all his officials. In addition, the monarch is the 
symbol of judicial independence, since he is only subordinated to God’s law. Such 
a strong opinion does not apply to officials of justice who act on his behalf. They 
are only “an extension of the hand of justice” of the prince. Other postulates for 
the prince formulated by John of Salisbury, express a kind of political realism – its 
weaker version ascompared to, for example, Marsilius of Padua. They include:
1. The prince should be rich. However, it should not be selfishly treated as his 
treasure. In fact, the wealth of the ruler is to serve the people, or even be 
considered as the wealth of the people.38
2. The prince should be able to reconcile his majesty with the majesty of the 
people, and he should show respect to the people by treating them according to 
their social position. However, this directive applies when he acts as a private 
person. Neither the prince nor his officials should allow the fraternisation of the 
subjects with the authority. Hence, in practice, a certain degree of haughtiness 
of the authority is necessary, because any disregard and contempt are born out 
36  Ibidem, p. 65.
37  Ibidem, p. 64.
38  He wrote: “He will therefore not regard as his own the wealth of which he has the custody 
for the account of others, nor will he treat as private the property of the fisc, which is acknowledged 
to be public. Nor is this any ground for wonder since he is not even his own man, but belongs wholly 
to his subjects”, ibidem, p. 74.
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of equal social relations. The prince should constantly remember to retain his 
grandeur and public splendour, and ensure that his personal situation does not 
undermine the dignity of his public rank. This especially concerns judges in 
corpore.39 He also needs to make sure that his personal dignity does not violate 
the dignity of others and, thus, the public authority is not harmed. 
The actions of the prince should be moderate. This should be expressed 
both in the content and the form of his activity. He should especially maintain 
consistency in punishment, but he also must show the ability to pardon and show 
mercy. Showing mercy is especially important, as “This, however, is certain, that it 
is safer for the cords to be relaxed than to be stretched too tautly”.40 This promotes 
respect for the prince and justice itself. In fact, the justice of the prince is more 
important than a judgment: “For the honour of a king delights in judgment and 
represses the faults of offenders with tranquil moderation of mind”.41 In general, 
any precipitation and “violent passion” is not good, it is simply harmful to the 
reign and the salvation of the ruler. But also any excess and exaggeration in the 
behaviour of the prince are a mistake. It needs to be stressed that the view of John 
of Salisbury that especially the excess of goodness and actions considered to be 
good, is not just a mistake, but it is actually very bad for the ruler. 
3. Although the prince is the head of a political body, in practice his justice 
requires the cooperation of officials. He must give them a sense of security. 
Then, the power of justice will not fade in himself. The justice of the prince 
determines the virtuous behaviour of other members of the political body.42
When the prince follows these rules, he may expect an award both in the 
earthly life and after death. This is supposed to ensure the long reign both of him 
and his successors. However, the essence of this award is that “»a long reign« 
means a reign for the life-time of the unfailing soul who will be crowned with the 
glory of eternal blessedness for a kingdom well administered”.43 Any injustice 
eventually destroys kingdoms.44 It is legitimate to say that rulers of states should 
have honour and respect for God, inner discipline, educated officials and people 
39  Cf. ibidem, p. 83.
40  Ibidem, p. 85, he further explains: “For while justice is one thing and godliness another, still 
both are so necessary to the prince that whoever without them attains, not necessarily to princely 
power, but even to any magistracy whatever, mocks himself in vain but will surely provoke against 
himself the mockery and scorn and hatred of others”, ibidem, p. 86.
41  Ibidem, p. 86.
42  He concludes his discussion: “But when through the negligence or concealment of the 
prince as regards the members there is loss of strength or good reputation, then diseases and 
blemishes come upon his own members. Nor does the well-being of the head long continue when 
sickness attacks the members”, ibidem, p. 98.
43  Ibidem, p. 89.
44  John of Salisbury explains: “Injustice, the Stoics think, is a frame of mind which banishes 
equity from the realm of the habits”, ibidem, p. 96.
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in power, and the love and care for his subjects.45 These general ideas rationalising 
the authority of the prince are the obvious result of the Christian worldview of 
John of Salisbury, the Archbishop of Canterbury. They also have a clear political 
dimension. With his sophisticated intellect, the author of Policraticus supports the 
authority of the Church (the papacy), its sovereignty over the secular authority, 
in fact, after all, “the inferior” ecclesiastical authority. These are the boundaries 
of his projection of the rationalisation of the authority. Among others, these 
ideas will find their expression in later hierocratic concepts and in the political 
disputes between the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy, and in the subsequent 
achievements of popes Gregory VII, Innocent III, and Boniface VIII.
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SUMMARY
The Middle Ages was the era of the duality of power. The concept and understanding of power 
was dynamic at that time. The issue looked different in the early Middle Ages and different in the 
medieval period of “the enlightenment”. In this situation, the rational or rationalizing arguments 
were supported by both proponents of the papalistic vision of the state, as well as the supporters 
of the concept of autonomous secular authority. It must be borne in mind that at the time of John 
of Salisbury (c. 1115–1180), the State was confessional, the difference between the sacred and the 
profane was only just intuitively perceived and was part of a long and complex process, which in 
a sense, ended upon the arrival of Niccolo Machiavelli’s definition of the State. John of Salisbury 
formulates the following opinions on the essence of power: Firstly, it is a vision of a sinless 
monarch. According to him, it is basically the only condition of the recognition of the ruler as a real 
prince (princeps). The opposite of this legitimate authority is a tyrant. The requiremen there is 
appropriate education. It has to be princeps educatus (litteratus). Secondly, it is the organic vision 
of the state in which the political body is governed by the head, which is the habitat of reason, 
which is only subject to the conscience or the clergy. The construction of the State reflects the 
wisdom of God, who created man “in his own image and likeness”. Therefore, the State is the 
reflection (expression) of humanity and its reasonable part. Thirdly, the particular parts of the State 
(its members) imitate the man and interact with one another. The two values which were earlier 
raised by St. Augustine: ordinis and pax can be ensured by reasonable and thus fair authority of 
a prince, which was already named as public authority by John of Salisbury. Fourthly, the authority 
of prince is exercised in protecting the law of God both by him and by his subjects, and its objective 
is the realisation of the common good. The implementation of the above objectives in practice is to 
be the result of certain rational guarantees which are formulated by John of Salisbury towards the 
authority of prince. 
Keywords: princeps; tyrant; law of nature; education of prince; counselling of priests; 
common good; independence of prince’s judgement; loyalty of officials
STRESZCZENIE
Średniowiecze było epoką dualizmu władzy. Ujęcie i rozumienie władzy było wówczas dy-
namiczne. Inaczej problem ten kształtował się we wczesnym średniowieczu, a inaczej w średnio-
wiecznym okresie „oświecenia”. W takiej sytuacji po argumenty racjonalne, czy racjonalizujące, 
sięgali zarówno zwolennicy papalistycznej wizji państwa, jak i koncepcji autonomicznej władzy 
świeckiej. Pamiętać należy o tym, że w czasach Jana z Salisbury (ok. 1115–1180) państwo miało 
charakter wyznaniowy, różnica pomiędzy sacrum i profanum była dopiero intuicyjnie postrzegana, 
będąc fragmentem długiego i złożonego procesu, który w pewnym sensie zakończy dopiero defini-
cja państwa Niccolo Machiavellego. Jan z Salisbury formułuje następujące opinie dotyczące istoty 
władzy. Po pierwsze, jest to wizja bezgrzesznego monarchy. To jest w zasadzie jedyny jego zdaniem 
warunek uznania panującego za prawdziwego księcia (princepsa). Przeciwieństwem takiej prawo-
witej władzy jest tyran. Służyć temu ma wymóg odpowiedniego wykształcenia. Ma to być princeps 
educatus (litteratus). Po drugie, organiczna wizja państwa, w którym ciałem politycznym zarządza 
głowa, czyli siedlisko rozumu, poddana jedynie zwierzchności sumienia, czyli klerowi. Budowa 
państwa odzwierciedla mądrość Boga, który stworzył człowieka „na swój obraz i podobieństwo”. 
Stąd państwo jest odbiciem (wyrazem) człowieczeństwa i jego rozumnej części. Po trzecie, po-
szczególne części państwa (jego członki) imitują człowieka i współdziałają ze sobą. Dwie wartości 
podnoszone wcześniej przez świętego Augustyna: ordinis i pax są możliwe do zapewnienia dzięki 
racjonalnie działającej i w efekcie sprawiedliwej władzy księcia nazwanej przez Jana z Salisbury 
Princeps educatus in the Thought of John of Salisbury 23
władzą publiczną. Po czwarte, władza księcia realizuje się w strzeżeniu prawa Bożego zarówno 
przez niego, jak i przez poddanych, a jej celem jest realizacja dobra wspólnego. Realizacja powyż-
szych założeń w praktyce ma być efektem pewnych rozumowych gwarancji, które wobec władzy 
księcia formułuje Jan z Salisbury. 
Słowa kluczowe: princeps; tyran; prawo natury; wykształcenie; doradztwo kapłanów; dobro 
wspólne; niezawisłość sądu księcia; lojalność urzędników

